Fix: Complete SSH bootstrap hardening

.claude/skills/panama/SKILL.md

@@ -99,10 +99,19 @@ Before it offers SSH hardening, it copies a safe root key when possible or
 verifies the target key. The target user's `.ssh` must be owned by that user at
 `0700`, and `authorized_keys` must be owned by that user at `0600`. Without a
 verified target key, SSH hardening is unavailable and the bootstrap continues.
+Every non-comment key line must parse with `ssh-keygen`. Root-key destination
+creation and writing run as the target UID, followed by the same owner, mode,
+and key checks. Do not replace that with root writes or assume the user's
+primary group matches the username.
 
-Accepted hardening uses an atomic same-directory `sshd_config.d` drop-in,
-runs `sshd -t`, then reloads the detected SSH unit. Validation or reload
-failure restores the previous drop-in before it retries validation and reload;
-failed recovery stops the handoff with manual recovery instructions. The
-fixture contracts exercise those branches. `panama test --safe` never reloads
-a live daemon, so it is not live-host proof.
+Accepted hardening uses atomic same-directory `00-panama.conf` with exactly
+`PermitRootLogin no`, `PasswordAuthentication no`, and
+`KbdInteractiveAuthentication no`. A pre-existing symlink or non-regular
+object makes hardening unavailable, as does a missing SSH unit. Panama runs
+`sshd -t`, then checks effective root and target-user policy with `sshd -T -C`
+before reloading the detected unit. Validation or reload failure restores a
+prior regular file with its metadata before it retries validation and reload.
+Failed recovery stops the handoff with instructions that distinguish a prior
+file from no prior file. The fixture contracts also cover declined hardening
+and interrupted preparation. `panama test --safe` never reloads a live daemon,
+so it is not live-host proof.