Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Gabriel Brown e4409ed6aa Surface the login keyring, and offer to unlock it
The keyring is already unlocked at sign-in exactly as GNOME does it --
pam_gnome_keyring is in GDM's stack and the journal confirms it works
("gnome-keyring-daemon started properly and unlocked keyring"). So there
was no configuration bug to fix. What a bare Hyprland session lacks is
anywhere to see when that has stopped being true.

It stops being true rarely and expensively. gnome-keyring-daemon crashed
once on this machine -- an upstream abort in service_method_open_session,
with a core dump -- and D-Bus then activated a replacement. That
replacement never received the login password, so the keyring was locked
in the middle of a session that had unlocked it correctly at login.
Nothing announces this. What you see instead is a mail account that will
not authenticate, a git push that cannot find its key, or an integration
reporting "not configured", none of which mention keyrings. That is the
same root cause as the Home Assistant token failure earlier.

Privacy & Security now shows the state, offers an Unlock action that
raises the standard password dialog, and reports when the daemon holding
your secrets is a D-Bus replacement rather than PAM's -- because a
replacement that is currently unlocked was unlocked by hand and will not
survive a restart. The password never passes through Panama.

The contract stubs the secret service rather than touching the real one:
locking the login keyring breaks every saved password on the machine and
can only be undone by typing the password into a dialog, so it is not
something a test suite may do to a daily driver. Verified it catches a
helper that misreports locked as unlocked, and one that crashes instead
of reporting a missing service.

Worth recording: a locked keyring makes a NON-INTERACTIVE caller appear
to hang. It is not hung -- it is waiting on a dialog nobody is looking
at, which is exactly how the earlier secret-tool investigation lost an
hour.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRvzt4H8XXLPVH5MyYdk9L
2026-08-18 10:34:41 -04:00
Gabriel Brown 9b2fa80ab7 Drop the product branding: this is just Settings
It is the system settings app for this desktop, so it is named the way
one is. The window is "Settings", the titlebar is "Settings", the
wordmark above the search field is gone, the sidebar's last row is
"About", and the status line reads "Desktop is healthy".

Prose followed the same rule. Forty-odd strings explained what "Panama"
does -- "Panama never animates while idle", "Restore Panama defaults",
"Panama looks in ~/Pictures/Wallpapers" -- which is how a product
describes itself, not how a settings panel describes a setting. They now
say what happens. No user-visible "Panama" remains anywhere in the app.

Two consequences worth naming:

The SUPER+I shortcut's description is user-visible, because the
Shortcuts page is generated from it, so that is renamed too. Rebindings
are keyed by shipped chord rather than description, so no existing
override is orphaned by this.

Three contracts matched the window by title and one matched that
shortcut by description; all four are updated. There are no Hyprland
window rules keyed on the title, so nothing about the window's placement
changes.

The desktop entry is now Name=Settings, but the FILE keeps its
panama-settings name, as does the icon: the dock pins applications by
desktop id, and renaming the file would silently unpin it.
dock-pins-contract covers exactly that.

The dated design docs under docs/superpowers keep the old name. They are
a record of what was decided when, and editing them to agree with the
present would make them lie about the past.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRvzt4H8XXLPVH5MyYdk9L
2026-08-18 10:08:55 -04:00
Gabriel Brown 14529c011f Add a Privacy & Security page
Continuing towards GNOME Settings parity. GNOME's Privacy panel covers
screen lock, camera and microphone access, file history, trash, and
device security; Panama had no equivalent page at all, despite already
tracking camera and microphone use for the bar indicator.

Device security is a new read-only readout: Secure Boot, TPM, disk
encryption, SELinux mode, and the firewall. None of these is a
preference -- they are set in firmware, at install time, or by system
policy, and a switch offering to change them would either fail or do
something far-reaching from a control that looks like every other
control. What it answers is "is this machine set up the way I think it
is", which otherwise takes five commands and root. Facts that cannot be
determined report Unknown rather than guessing, because a security
readout that quietly says "fine" when it failed to look is worse than
no readout.

File history and trash retention are deliberately NOT offered as
switches. They are GNOME preferences enforced by gsd-housekeeping, which
does not run in a Hyprland session -- verified, it is not running here.
Toggling them would store a preference, change nothing, and give no sign
of it. They are delegated to GNOME Settings by name instead.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRvzt4H8XXLPVH5MyYdk9L
2026-08-18 08:20:04 -04:00