Two of the panels this desktop still handed to GNOME Settings. Users manages the account through accountsservice -- the same daemon GNOME's panel drives, so a name or picture set here is what the login screen and lock screen read. Name, picture, account type, password, automatic login, and adding or removing other accounts. Every change is authorized by polkit through the agent this session already runs; a dismissed prompt is a normal outcome and says so. A new password is read from the helper's stdin, hashed by openssl reading its own stdin, and handed over D-Bus from inside that process. It is never an argument: argv is world-readable through /proc, so a password passed that way is published to every process on the machine. Removing an account takes two presses and says it destroys their files; the last administrator cannot be removed or demoted, because a machine nobody can administer is not a state to offer. Sharing reports what is actually true, including "the software for this is not installed" -- the honest answer for Samba here, and the case the panel it replaces shows as a switch that does nothing. Password sign-in is reported from sshd's configuration rather than assumed: claiming "keys only" when the file is silent would state a security property that cannot be backed up. The Control Center now draws the account's real picture and name. A generic glyph sat there while a real avatar was already set, which made the desktop look like it did not know whose it was. Also here: the KDE Connect contract no longer requires a phone to be awake. kdeconnectd drops its device objects for a phone it has not seen recently while the pairing survives in its config, so demanding one failed whenever the phone was off. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRvzt4H8XXLPVH5MyYdk9L
95 lines
4.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
95 lines
4.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Managing a LOCAL user account (see online-accounts for the other kind).
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#
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# Managing an account must not leak the credential it sets, and must not let
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# someone lock themselves out of their own machine.
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#
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# Nothing here creates, deletes, or modifies a real account. It reads the
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# account state, which is safe, and exercises the refusals, which are the part
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# that has to hold.
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set -uo pipefail
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repo_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
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helper="$repo_dir/config/dot/quickshell/scripts/panama-users"
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service="$repo_dir/config/dot/quickshell/services/UserAccounts.qml"
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page="$repo_dir/config/dot/quickshell/modules/settings/UsersPage.qml"
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fail() {
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printf 'user accounts contract: %s\n' "$1" >&2
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exit 1
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}
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for path in "$helper" "$service" "$page"; do
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[[ -r "$path" ]] || fail "missing $path"
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done
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[[ -x "$helper" ]] || fail 'panama-users is not executable'
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# ── A new password never reaches a command line ─────────────────────────────
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# argv is world-readable through /proc, so a password passed as an argument is
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# published to every process on the machine. It is read from stdin, and the
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# hashing step reads ITS stdin too, so the cleartext exists only inside these
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# two processes.
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password_body="$(sed -n '/^def set_password/,/^def /p' "$helper")"
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[[ -n "$password_body" ]] || fail 'set_password is missing'
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grep -q 'sys.stdin.buffer.read()' <<<"$password_body" \
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|| fail 'the new password is not read from stdin'
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grep -q 'input=secret' <<<"$password_body" \
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|| fail 'the password is not handed to the hashing tool on stdin'
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grep -qE '"openssl", "passwd"[^]]*secret' <<<"$password_body" \
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&& fail 'the password appears in the hashing command line'
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grep -qE '^\s*print\((secret|hashed)' <<<"$password_body" \
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&& fail 'the password or its hash is printed'
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# The service must not hold one either, beyond the moment it hands it over.
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grep -q 'stdinEnabled' "$service" \
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|| fail 'the service does not write the password over stdin'
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grep -qE 'command:.*set-password.*password' "$service" \
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&& fail 'the service puts the password in the command line'
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grep -q 'root.pendingPassword = ""' "$service" \
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|| fail 'the service never clears the password it was holding'
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# ── Refusals that keep a machine administrable ──────────────────────────────
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delete_body="$(sed -n '/^def delete_user/,/^def /p' "$helper")"
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grep -q 'You cannot delete the account you are signed in to' <<<"$delete_body" \
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|| fail 'the helper would delete the account running it'
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grep -q 'only administrator' <<<"$delete_body" \
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|| fail 'the helper would remove the last administrator, leaving nobody able to administer the machine'
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# The page must not offer to change the type of the only administrator either.
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grep -q 'administratorCount <= 1' "$page" \
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|| fail 'the page offers to demote the only administrator'
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# ── Deleting is confirmed, and says what it destroys ────────────────────────
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grep -q 'confirmingRemoval' "$page" \
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|| fail 'the page deletes an account without a confirmation step'
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grep -q 'This cannot be undone' "$page" \
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|| fail 'the page does not say that deleting an account destroys their files'
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# ── The snapshot is real, and reports no secrets ────────────────────────────
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command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1 || { printf 'user accounts contract: SKIP (no jq)\n'; exit 0; }
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snapshot="$("$helper" snapshot 2>/dev/null)" || fail 'snapshot failed'
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jq -e '.users | type == "array" and length > 0' <<<"$snapshot" >/dev/null \
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|| fail 'no accounts were reported'
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jq -e '[.users[] | (.userName | length > 0)] | all' <<<"$snapshot" >/dev/null \
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|| fail 'an account has no user name'
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jq -e '.currentUser | length > 0' <<<"$snapshot" >/dev/null \
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|| fail 'the snapshot does not say which account is signed in'
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offenders="$(jq -r '[paths | map(tostring) | join(".")] | map(select(test("(password|secret|hash)$";"i"))) | join(", ")' <<<"$snapshot")"
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[[ -z "$offenders" ]] || fail "the snapshot carries credential-shaped fields: $offenders"
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# System accounts are not people and must not be offered for management.
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jq -e '[.users[] | .uid >= 1000] | all' <<<"$snapshot" >/dev/null \
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|| fail 'a system account is listed as a manageable user'
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# ── Input validation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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for bad in "root; rm -rf /" "../escape" "UPPER" ""; do
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result="$("$helper" set-real-name "$bad" "Test" 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.error // ""')"
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[[ -n "$result" ]] || fail "the helper accepted \"$bad\" as a user name"
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done
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printf 'user accounts contract: PASS (%d account(s), credentials never on a command line)\n' \
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"$(jq '.users | length' <<<"$snapshot")"
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