Gabriel Brown
14529c011f
Continuing towards GNOME Settings parity. GNOME's Privacy panel covers screen lock, camera and microphone access, file history, trash, and device security; Panama had no equivalent page at all, despite already tracking camera and microphone use for the bar indicator. Device security is a new read-only readout: Secure Boot, TPM, disk encryption, SELinux mode, and the firewall. None of these is a preference -- they are set in firmware, at install time, or by system policy, and a switch offering to change them would either fail or do something far-reaching from a control that looks like every other control. What it answers is "is this machine set up the way I think it is", which otherwise takes five commands and root. Facts that cannot be determined report Unknown rather than guessing, because a security readout that quietly says "fine" when it failed to look is worse than no readout. File history and trash retention are deliberately NOT offered as switches. They are GNOME preferences enforced by gsd-housekeeping, which does not run in a Hyprland session -- verified, it is not running here. Toggling them would store a preference, change nothing, and give no sign of it. They are delegated to GNOME Settings by name instead. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRvzt4H8XXLPVH5MyYdk9L
84 lines
4.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
84 lines
4.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Device security facts, as JSON.
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#
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# Everything here is READ-ONLY and deliberately so. Secure Boot, TPM presence,
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# disk encryption, SELinux mode and the firewall are set in firmware, at install
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# time, or by system policy -- none of them is a desktop preference, and a
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# settings app that offered to toggle them would either fail or do something
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# far-reaching from a switch that looks like any other.
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#
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# What it is for is answering "is this machine set up the way I think it is",
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# which is the question GNOME's Device Security panel exists to answer and which
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# otherwise needs five commands and root.
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#
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# Each fact is reported as {value, ok} where `ok` marks the reassuring state, so
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# the UI can highlight what deserves attention without hard-coding the meaning
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# of each string. Anything that cannot be determined reports "Unknown" with
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# ok:false rather than guessing, because a security readout that quietly reports
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# "fine" when it failed to look is worse than no readout.
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set -uo pipefail
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fact() {
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jq -cn --arg label "$1" --arg value "$2" --argjson ok "$3" --arg detail "${4:-}" \
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'{label: $label, value: $value, ok: $ok, detail: $detail}'
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}
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facts=()
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# ── Secure Boot ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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if command -v mokutil >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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case "$(mokutil --sb-state 2>/dev/null)" in
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*"SecureBoot enabled"*) facts+=("$(fact "Secure Boot" "Enabled" true "Firmware verifies the bootloader and kernel signatures")" ) ;;
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*"SecureBoot disabled"*) facts+=("$(fact "Secure Boot" "Disabled" false "Firmware does not verify what it boots")") ;;
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*) facts+=("$(fact "Secure Boot" "Unknown" false "The firmware did not report a Secure Boot state")") ;;
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esac
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elif [[ -d /sys/firmware/efi ]]; then
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facts+=("$(fact "Secure Boot" "Unknown" false "Install mokutil to report this")")
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else
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facts+=("$(fact "Secure Boot" "Not applicable" false "This machine booted in legacy BIOS mode")")
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fi
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# ── TPM ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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tpm_major="$(cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/tpm_version_major 2>/dev/null || true)"
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if [[ -n "$tpm_major" ]]; then
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facts+=("$(fact "TPM" "Version $tpm_major" true "A trusted platform module is present and usable")")
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elif [[ -e /sys/class/tpm/tpm0 ]]; then
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facts+=("$(fact "TPM" "Present" true "A trusted platform module is present")")
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else
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facts+=("$(fact "TPM" "None" false "No trusted platform module, so keys cannot be sealed to this machine")")
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fi
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# ── Disk encryption ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Counts LUKS mappings rather than naming them: which volume is encrypted is
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# more detail than this readout needs, and device names are not meaningful here.
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crypt_count="$(lsblk -o TYPE 2>/dev/null | grep -c '^crypt$' || true)"
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[[ "$crypt_count" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || crypt_count=0
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if (( crypt_count > 0 )); then
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facts+=("$(fact "Disk encryption" "$crypt_count encrypted volume$( (( crypt_count == 1 )) || printf 's')" true "Data at rest is protected by LUKS")")
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else
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facts+=("$(fact "Disk encryption" "None" false "No LUKS volume is unlocked on this machine")")
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fi
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# ── SELinux ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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if command -v getenforce >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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case "$(getenforce 2>/dev/null)" in
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Enforcing) facts+=("$(fact "SELinux" "Enforcing" true "Policy violations are blocked")") ;;
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Permissive) facts+=("$(fact "SELinux" "Permissive" false "Violations are logged but allowed")") ;;
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Disabled) facts+=("$(fact "SELinux" "Disabled" false "Mandatory access control is off")") ;;
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*) facts+=("$(fact "SELinux" "Unknown" false "")") ;;
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esac
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fi
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# ── Firewall ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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if systemctl list-unit-files firewalld.service >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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if [[ "$(systemctl is-active firewalld 2>/dev/null)" == "active" ]]; then
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facts+=("$(fact "Firewall" "Active" true "firewalld is filtering incoming connections")")
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else
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facts+=("$(fact "Firewall" "Inactive" false "firewalld is installed but not running")")
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fi
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fi
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printf '[%s]\n' "$(IFS=,; printf '%s' "${facts[*]}")"
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